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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
~TATE OF UTAH,

Plaint if!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

D A >; I E L RA YE \\~DOLE and
HON ALO ALLEN MAY,
Defendants-Appellants.

13009

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE:\1E:\'T OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant." appeal from a decision denying their motion t.o di.--miss their conviction on the charge of robbery
on tht' ground that they were denied the right to a speedy
trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
:\ppdlant..., wt>re tried and convicted of the crime of
rohl~:rY. 111l'ir trial and motion to dismiss were conducted
lwfon• the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, in the Second
.Judicial Di...,trict Court of \Veber County, State of Utah.
St•nt<-rn·t· was imposed for not less than five years and
clt•ft·ndant.'-' art' now in thP Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decision of tlw lower
court be affirmed.
STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

The first complaint charging the defendant" with
robbery on May 14, 1971, was filed on .:\1ay 17, l~fil (T.
33). The defendants were arrested a short time lakr in
the Davis County Jail while awaiting trial on other
charges (T. 8, 9). The defendants had the aid of counsel
during proceedings on the other chargL-s ( T. .1:2 J. Defendants were incarcerated in the Davis Count>· .Jail W1til January 28, 1972, when they were transferred to thP
Utah State Prison (T. 3). On Febmary :2:2, 1~)7:2, defendant Weddle filed a "'l\inety-day Disposition of
Charges" with the warden of the L~tah St.ak Prison ( T.
2). The complaint against the defendant-.; was tlwn dismissed on March 8, 1972, on the grounds that the defendants were not arraigned within seventy-two hour~-;
after ~ing arrested (T. 29, 141).
A new complaint was issued on ~larch 1.1, 197:2,
charging defendants with the same crime of robhPry· ( T.
1). Warrants of arrest were issued that same day ( T.
4, 5). The defendants were brought before the Honorable
E. F. Ziegler, Judge, where he appointed counsel for tlwm
on March 16, 1972 (T. 7). On April 7, 197:2, at a pn'liminary hearing before the Honorable Charles H. Srwddon, Judge, the defendant"' were bound O\'t•r to :-:tarnl
trial (T. 10). On April 20, 1972, an infonnation was filt'<l

( ~·· 1:.! : . ( •tm -c·I for defendants filed a Motion to Dis<

r1 ~ ~ ':, '. ~< ·d p:irt ia Ih on t hP alleged failure by the State
~o ::.<1·. id(' a 'il'('(h· trial rT. ~1 ). Regarding this specific
1-· lll". tlw l'l\\<·r rnurt d(·niP<l dPfPndant's motion because
'"of th<· h:1(·!·;.!"round on this matter and their being tied
up on th<· 1rn11~kr trial.;"' IT..:-!).
'Ilw dt.ft.ndant.; wnin·d their right to a jury trial on
\~a:-; l.'i. 1! 1 7~ 'T. :!S). On this same day, they were
er ,m·ickd of n ,Jil){•ry and were sentenced to a term of
fiYl' >·1 ·:11°'-.; to Ur· ti' run ronrnrrently with their previous
:-vii· c 'h·c· 'T. -10 i.

ARCl1 \fE:'.\l"T
POI:\T I.
l ':\DER THE B:\L.\:'\C'l>JG TEST RECENT-

LY EST.·\BLISHED BY THE UN I TED
ST:\ TES Sl 'PHE\tE CQl7RT, APPELLANTS'
RIGHT TO :\ SPEEDY TRIAL \VAS PRESEH\'ED.
Tiw l ~nit.eel States Supn•me Court in the recent case
of Harl.er \". \\'inf,'o. 407 P. S. Sl4, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972),
attt'mptt-d for t}w first time to set out the criteria by
which tlw -;pt-..·d:-; trial right is to be judged. Because the
right to a s1H'<'d>· t1ial is generically different from any
of tlw othl'r rights enshrined in the Constitution for the
prot< d ion of t }w arcust'<l. the Court PStablished a balancing tt-st to I~· appli(><l to mch ca~ on an ad hoc basis.
Four f:l!'tors \\1·n· idt ntifiro which must be considered
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together, along with such other circumstances as may he
relevant to determine wheth0r or not a defendant's right
to a speedy trial has been preserved.
The first factor ic; the length of delay. "1 B L'l'aus(•
of the L.11precision of the r:~ht to speed>· trial, the length
of delay that will provoke such an inquiry i....; lll"('(>Ssarily
dependent upon the peculiar circwnstances of the caS<·."
92 S. Ct. at 2192. The Court found a delay of well O\Tr
five years to not be a denial of the right to a spe«i>· t1;aJ
when considered with the two counter-balancing factors
of (1) minimal prejudice and (2) no desin• on thP part
of the defendant for a speedy trial.
The second factor is the reason for the delay. Tlw
Court stated:
"A deliberate attempt to dl'la>· tlw trial in
order to hamper the defense should bP Wl'igh<'d
heavily against the government. A mon· neutral
reason such as negligence or over-crowded cou rb
should be weighed less heavily but nev(•rthelt·c;,·
should be considered since the ultimat<.• responsibility for such circwnstances mtL'-'t rest with thl'
government rather than with the dc>frnd:wt." Id.
The third factor to consider is the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. The Court rPjPckd
the rigid rule that a defendant who fails to demand a
speedy trial forever waives his right.
"The result in practice is likelv to h<· l'ithl'r
an automatic, pro forma demand ~adP imn1(•diat;ely aft.er appointment of counsel or dt ·l:t ,."
which, but for the demand-waiver rulP would n~>t
'
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Ix~ t~1h·rat<-d. Such a Jesuit is not coru>istent with
th(·. mkn~L...;
of ddendants , society , or the Cons t"1..
t ut1on. Id. at ·~EH.
Tlw strength of a ch·fen<lant's efforts to assert his right
to a >IX"'(ly trial will be "affected by the length of the
d('la~. to --01rn· (·xt.t·nt by the reason for the delay, and
rn11~t p:11 I inilarl~ Ii\' tlw JH'r.--<mal prejudice" that the de-

f1·nda11t (·\1writ·rn·l's. Id. at :2192. "We emphasize that
failun· !4 1 a...;..-...·rt tht" right will make it difficult for a def1·11da111 to pr0\1· that h~· was <lPnied a speedy trial." Id.
at :1 1!1:).

Thi· i11urth fallur is prejudice to the defendant. The
right to >IX-..'(ly trial was designed to protect three inter-

t- of t lw dl·f1·ndant. The fil""t and most serious interest
i"' tlw possibility that the defenst· will be impaired. There
c:m he pn·judil'l· if w1tnt>sses dit'. disappear, or cannot
acn1rat.t-ly n·call t·\·t·nt....: of the di!'tant past. The second
inkn~t i..- to pn·\·1·nt oppres~ive pretrial incarceration.
Timi· ~pent in jail awaiting trial often means l~ of a
job: it disn1pb family life; it enforces idleness; and it
hindt·1~ dd1·rnla11t f 111111 gatlwring evidence in his deft•n.:t·. It i> 1'"'))('(.'iall~· unfortunate to impose such consequt·1H·1.,c 1111 tlw~1· J)('l~ons who are ultimately found to be
in no('( ·nt. Tlw third intt.·rPst i...; to minimize the anxiety
(~

and conct'm of the accused .
.\n analysi~ of the fact:; in the present

case ao; seen

undl'r tlw light of tlw Supremt• Court's balancing test

dt·:11-h- sho\h that :1ppt·llnnt"s right to a speedy trial was
not \·iolatvd. Tlw lt·11gth of dday from the time the first

ti

complaint was filed to the time appellant" were Jffl'S(·nted
to a magistrate concerning that charge was a littk• ll·ss
than -~en months. The rea~;on for the dela:-.· was that
the appellants were involved in another charge of gn·ater
gravity, i.e., murder. It would be contrary tD the intl'rest
of the public to allow \Veber Count:-.· to interfrrp in the
least with a murder trial in Davis County b:-.· tr:-.·ing to
concurrently prosecute the appellant..., on a robber:-.·
charge. There dearly is no evidence to establish that
there was a deliberate attempt to delay the trial or to
hamper the defense in any manner.
The record shows that only once was there an ::ssertion of the right to a speedy trial made on bt>half of appellants. Appellant Weddle filed a "Ninety-day Dispo...;ition of Charge" on February 22, 1972, which brought
appellants before the court on .t\1arch 8, 1972. The purpose of such a demand is to insure that a defendant's
right to a speedy trial is preserved. Since the first demand that appellants made was complied with, then· cPrtainly was no error on the part of the lower court sufficient to establish a denial of appellants' right to a SJWl'dy
trial.
Any prejudice to these defendant", the fourth factor
of the balancing test, is small if existent at all. Appdlants were either in jail or in prison from the beginning
of the present prosecution, ~fay 14, 1971, to tlw prPsent time due to another crime. Thus, evl·n if the
present action against appellants had not been initiated, appellants still would have been in jail or prison
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du• iii''. t]w ~aril1· JH·riod of time. Sinre the present action
h .d 11.J dft·cf up(Jn changing the condition of appellants,
it i.-.. t xtn·ml'ly unli;_t·I.\· that appellants were prejudiced
at all hy tlH· n1·arly t{·n month delay between the time
th1· r;; l compl:t!11t \\'as fill'd and the time appellants were
pn ( nt. d hdon· a magi.-.trak. There is no evidence that
th· i · dt !1 :1~t· ha.~ impairul because of witnesses dying,
di...,app,·;~ring ()r being unahlt· to accurately recall past
1·\·1·11L'. . \ppl'llanh certainly were not oppressively incarc!'r .. i1·d hdorl' thl'ir trial rtsulting in a loss of job or disrupti()n of family lifl'.
rt<1inly appt·llant...; cannot contend that they were
inn()n·nt, thus making prc>trial incarceration even more
hurdt·1bo11w. Tht· only is...;ut· on appeal is that of the right
tn a :-;pt·t·d:-; trial. );o question has been raised as to their
inrnJn·rn·t·. Fin:dly, then, is no evidence to believe that
apj><·ll:rnt...,' anxidy and rnnc('m was increased because
of tht ir dt·kntil!n and tlw delay in bringing them to trial
( '1

O!I

t ht· pn»l'l1t durgl' of roblx·ry.

CO:\CLl ':-;ION
By Wl'ighing t.ogt>tlwr t}w four factor~ of thl' Supreme

( '1Jurf:-' balancing t4.•st, it i:-; ch·ar that thl' short ddav
.'
('HU~'(l by thl' o\·t·rriding importan<.'(• of tlw adjudication
of a murdPr trial, \H·iglwd with tlw lack of prejudicl' to
appellant.,, impds the condusion that app<'llant...; were
m no way depriVl'(f of tht'ir right to a SJX't_'(fy trial.
Res1x·ct full:·• submi tk'(l,

\"ER:\O'\ B. no~t:\EY
:\ttornt•y Genl'ral
D:\ \"ID S. YOl T:\G
Chief Assistant Attorney GPneral

DA \'ID R. IR\"l~E
Assistant Attorney General
.Attorneys for Respondent

